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The New York Court of Appeals found in 2006 that ‘Coke’s classic edict [that a 
corpse has no value] is of more than historical interest: it has been a staple of the 
common law’.  While this is true, it is also true that the common law has found a 
myriad of exceptions to the general proposition of no property in a corpse – resulting 
in a situation that is far from clear in an age where biological materials from the living 
and from the deceased do have value.  The recent US decision of Colavito v New York 
Organ Donor Network Inc (2006) 8 N.Y.3d 43 maps the common law position and 
ultimately marks the biological matter of a deceased (in this case, a kidney) as 
‘person’ rather than ‘property’.  As has so often happened in cases dealing with this 
issue however, the court was able to sidestep a fuller explanation of the boundary, on 
the basis that the plaintiff had no enforceable right to the kidney in question as it was 
in any event histo-incompatible with his antibodies.  Whether this marking will 
remain sustainable in Australia in light of biotechnological advances is open to 
question.  The dilemma over legal marking of ‘personhood vs property’ remains at the 
interface of social and philosophical norms. 
 
 
I  Introduction  
 
Dispatch: "What's the problem there?" 
Caller: "I got a human foot." 
Dispatch: "Have a what?" 
Caller: "A human left foot." 
Dispatch: "What's your name?" 
Caller: "My name is Shannon Whisnant, and it's plum nasty. Got me grossed out."1 
911 call logged recently in Maiden, North Carolina, after the discovery of a human 
leg in a BBQ smoker purchased at auction. 
                                                
* Lecturer, School of Law, James Cook University 
1 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/10/03/amputated_leg_found_in_barbecue_smoker/, 28 October 
2007. 
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According to press reports, Whisnaut subsequently told local media he was willing to 
go to court to keep the leg and planned to charge admission to see it – US$3 for adults 
and $1 for children.  ‘It's a hell of a conversation piece,’ he told the Greenville News.  
‘I bought it.  It's mine.’  This is a clear example of a person seeking to enforce a 
property right.  In this simple statement (‘I bought it. It’s mine.’) Mr Whisnaut 
indicates that the human foot (with some leg attached) is a chattel personal, to which 
attaches a bundle of rights.   
 
Unfortunately however for Mr Wishnaut, the person to whose body the leg was 
originally attached wants his leg back.   
 
John Woods had his leg amputated in 2004 as a result of injuries he suffered in a 
plane crash.  He kept the amputated leg, planning to have it buried with him when he 
died.  Originally he kept the leg in his freezer but his electricity was disconnected.  He 
apparently hung it on his front fence, before storing it in his BBQ smoker in a storage 
facility.  When he defaulted in his payments for the storage, the storage owner 
auctioned his belongings – including the BBQ smoker with leg. 
 
Mr Woods’ actions in relation to the leg clearly indicate that he continues to view this 
leg as part of himself.  To him, the leg is not a chattel, but is a person.  It is him. 
 
Our question today is: what is the leg?  Is it person?  Or is it property?  Is the leg part 
of Mr Wood, whose body originally sported two fully attached lower limbs (but now 
sports only one)?  Or does it constitute a chattel, belonging to Mr Wishnaut who paid 
for it? 
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This paper concerns the way in which the law marks the boundary between 
personhood and property.  This is a contemporary issue – not just because of Mr 
Wood’s amputated leg – but because of the burgeoning biotechnology industry and 
the international movement towards repatriation of human remains taken from 
colonised societies around the world in centuries past.  These present the law with a 
dilemma of marking the boundary between what is person and what is thing. 
 
Today we’ll consider recent applications of the law in relation to human biological 
matter – matter taken from a deceased and matter taken from the living.  We’ll have a 
go then at applying these principles to the conundrum of (the very much alive) Mr 
Woods’ formerly attached leg. 
 
Marking the Legal Character of a Deceased Human  
Our starting point in this investigation of the law’s treatment of the human body is the 
status of a corpse at law.  The courts have long held that there is no property in a 
corpse.  While Roger Magnusson’s 1991 article points out that this is founded on 
flawed reasoning, the proposition was confirmed in 1908 in Australia in Doodeward v 
Spence.2  This case however found (by majority) that the preserved two-headed foetus 
was not a corpse; alternatively that it had been ‘so changed by the lawful exercise of 
human skill that it could no longer be regarded as a corpse awaiting burial’.3 
 
                                                
2 (1908) 6 CLR 406, 419.  
3 Ibid, 414. 
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In an earlier US case, Pierce v Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery,4 Potter J 
considered the body to be ‘a sort of quasi-property’.  This arose out of ‘our common 
humanity’ and was reflected more in relation to ‘duties to perform toward the body’ 
than anything approaching ownership as we might usually understand it.  Potter J felt 
this ‘quasi-property’ was in the nature of ‘a sacred trust for the benefit of all who may 
from family or friendship have an interest in it’.5  This statement was cited with 
approval by the English Court of Appeal in 1996, in Dobson v North Tyneside Health 
Authority,6 which also reiterated the old principle that there was no property in a 
corpse.  This approach was also applied in a 1997 NSW decision.7  (These issues are 
currently being considered by the Queensland Law Reform Commission.) 
 
Regardless of the apparently dubious foundation of the principle, this centuries-old 
law has been recently applied in Colavito v New York Organ Donor Network Inc8 
where the New York Court of Appeal said that ‘Coke’s classic edict [that a corpse has 
no value] is of more than historical interest; it has been a staple of the common law’.9 
 
Colavito is of interest to us today, because it deals with different issues from those 
simply concerning the demarcation of living (personhood) from dead (person or 
property).  It considers the nature of human biological matter taken from a deceased, 
rather than the whole of the corpse considered in these earlier cases. 
 
                                                
4 14 Am Rep 667 (1872). See citation in Smith v Tamworth City Council (1997) 41 NSWLR 680, 691.  
5 Ibid, 677.  
6 [1996] 4 All ER 474.  
7 Smith v Tamworth City Council (1997) 41 NSWLR 680 
8 (2006) 8 N.Y.3d 43. 
9 Ibid, 50. 
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Colavito10 was heard by the US Court of Appeals.  The widow of a deceased man 
promised his kidney to the plaintiff.  The hospital instead gave the kidney to another 
patient.  The plaintiff, who missed out on the kidney, sued in conversion.  The court 
started its investigation looking at the idea of property in a corpse.  It accepted that the 
only kind of property in a corpse was the right of the next of kin to possess it for 
burial.  This could be the ‘quasi-property’ referred to earlier: in any event, this 
maintains the marking of the corpse as person rather than wholly as property. 
 
The next question is far more topical and probably more controversial.  This is 
whether application of this rule could establish a ‘public policy against finding 
property rights in donated organs’.11  That is, the question becomes not is there 
property in a complete deceased human, but rather is there property in biological 
matter forming part only of a deceased human.  Is a portion of the deceased property 
or is it still person?   
 
The New York Appeals Court in Colavito reviewed the cases relating to recovery of 
body parts after death.  It found the common theme upheld by the courts was ‘the 
concept of decent burial for an undesecrated body’.12  The court then added that it had 
‘been careful about characterising causes of action that impose liability for violating 
these sensibilities.  In all instances, we have disclaimed any reliance on a theory of 
property rights in a dead body.’13  The Court of Appeals of New York found no basis 
on which to ‘forecast the circumstances in which someone may conceivably have 
                                                
10 (2006) 438 F.3d 214. 
11 Ibid, 224. 
12 (2006) 8 N.Y.3d 43, 52 
13 Ibid. 
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actionable rights in the body or organ of a deceased person’14 and confirmed that the 
plaintiff had ‘no common law right to the organ’.   
 
While a US decision, the case confirms the Anglo-Australian approaches – the law is 
clear in marking the boundary between person and property in relation to a corpse and 
parts of a corpse – these comments support the maintenance of a clear delineation 
between personhood and property, in particular the characterisation of the corpse or 
parts of it as representing particular human sensibilities. 
 
The marking of the human as sacred was explicit in the 2007 English decision of Re 
St Mary Sledmore.15  This case involved an application for the exhumation of Sir 
Mark Sykes and Lady Edith Sykes for the purposes of testing Sir Mark’s tissue 
samples.  Sir Mark died in 1919 of Spanish flu and the petitioner in this case, a world 
renowned researcher into bird flu, sought to use data from the tissue samples (if there 
were any remaining) to ‘unravel the genetic structure of the virus’.16  Lady Edith’s 
body was buried on top of Sir Mark’s and therefore had to be exhumed to provide 
access to Sir Mark’s coffin.  Importantly, the surviving members of the family of the 
deceased had all consented to the exhumation.  The petitioner however needed to 
overcome the law’s presumption against exhumation.  Two other recent decisions on 
exhumation were discussed by the court,17  and these three cases together illustrate the 
rigorous methodology of the court in relation to the taking of tissue samples from 
interred remains.   
 
                                                
14 Ibid, 53. 
15 [2007] All ER 238. 
16 Ibid, [2]. 
17 In re Holy Trinity, Bosham [2004] Fam 125; In re St Nicholas Sevenoaks [2005] 1 WLR 1011. 
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The court firstly establishes as the norm, the Christian doctrine that burial in 
consecrated ground is final and permanent.18  On this basis, the applicant is required 
to show some special case warranting a deviation from the norm.  This must be a 
‘cogent and compelling case for the legitimacy of proposed research’ which could rest 
on national or historic importance or scientific experimentation.19  The court then had 
to weigh the public benefit that may ensue from the research.  This approach is 
consistent with the marking of human remains as human, not as property. 
 
In looking at the evidence, the judge was concerned that there was no guarantee that 
Sir Mark’s coffin would yield any tissue sample at all.  The quality of the tissue could 
only be assessed on opening the coffin, but to allow exhumation the court must first 
be satisfied of public benefit.20  There was no guarantee of a public benefit though, 
because of the uncertainty as to the existence of tissue to sample.  In addition, the 
scientist was only testing a theory and the result of course could not be known in 
advance – there was no possibility of demonstrating incontestably a public benefit on 
this basis.21   
 
The court was prepared though to accept grounds for exhumation of lesser weight as 
the purpose of exhumation was scientific, and in particular, this may result in 
treatment of ‘dangerous diseases’.22  In this case, the court found the grounds were 
exceptional on the basis that they were to carry out ‘legitimate scientific research’ and 
that ‘proving or negating the theories advanced by [the petitioner], will advance the 
                                                
18 Re St Mary Sledmore [2007] All ER 238, [13]. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid [18]. 
21 Ibid [17]. 
22 Ibid [20]. 
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capability of others to combat the H5N1 virus’.23  Thus there was no need to show 
that the research would directly lead to a cure for bird flu, as simply closing off a line 
of inquiry would bring an overall public benefit. 
 
While this case was required to decide on exhumation rather than simply dealing with 
the legal status of human tissue, it does demonstrate, in general terms, a framework 
within which courts can deal with such matters – including the means of providing a 
norm against which to measure a legal response to dealing with human remains.  
Without going into human rights issues, it is submitted that this framework can be 
applied by analogy in relation to the remains of Indigenous people in museums.  
Rather than applying a property-based framework and an exception to the ‘no 
property in a corpse rule’ per Doodeward v Spence, the law could mark the remains as 
human and apply the norm of the spiritual practice relevant to the culture from which 
the remains were taken.  Like St Mary Sledmore, consent of living descendents would 
remain a relevant factor; and the court must be satisfied that a substantial scientific 
contribution will be made towards a significant public benefit.  In respect of the latter, 
it would seem that general research on human remains without identifying a particular 
public benefit, would not be sufficient to justify the right to possession of human 
tissue samples. 
 
Marking the Legal Character of Live Human Tissue 
The leading authority in relation to the marking of human tissue from a live person, is 
Moore v Regents of University of California.24  This 1990 decision in the US Supreme 
Court concerned the legal status of a ‘cell-line’ produced by researchers from cells 
                                                
23 Ibid [21]. 
24 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
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taken from Mr Moore’s spleen.  They were taken with consent, but the scientific 
purpose was not disclosed.  Like Colavito, Mr Moore sued in conversion.  By a 
majority, the court looked at public policy issues regarding research and development 
and consent, and while it didn’t deny the possibility of marking human tissue as 
property, it held that ‘the novelty of the claim demanded express consideration of the 
policies to be served by extending liability’.25 
 
This approach has been extensively debated.  It’s safe to say that it’s unlikely that it 
definitively denies marking the human tissue as property.  After all, as Broussard J 
pointed out in dissent, if the cell line were stolen, surely an action in conversion 
would lie?  This presupposes legal status of property in the human tissue. 
 
Exceptions to the ‘No Property’ Rule 
In spite of the common law presumption against property in a corpse applied so 
directly in Colavito, it is possible to establish proprietary interests in a corpse in 
certain situations.  In Doodeward v Spence for instance, it was held that such 
possession was not unlawful if the body possesses attributes that mean its preservation 
may afford valuable or interesting information or instruction,26 that differentiate it 
‘from a mere corpse awaiting burial.’27  It was also suggested in this case that there 
may be property in a mummy due to the skill of the embalmer having turned it into 
something else.28  (I wonder if Mr Woods could use this argument in relation to his 
apparently preserved leg.)  In addition, Barton J considered a foetus not to fall within 
the definition of a corpse. 
                                                
25 Ibid, 493. 
26 Doodeward v Spence (1908) 6 CLR 406, 413-4.  
27 Ibid, 414.  
28 Ibid, 422. See also Roger S. Magnusson, ‘The Recognition of Proprietary Rights in Human Tissue in 
Common Law Jurisdictions’, (1992) 18 Melbourne University Law Review 601-29, 603-7.   
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While St Mary Sledmore cannot be construed as an exception to the ‘no property’ 
rule, it does identify a way of allowing possession of human tissue.  In the case of 
Colavito, the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act provided the original authority for 
possession of the kidney – but not it seems property in the kidney.  The court 
expressly disclaimed any analogy to be drawn from the legislation that property 
vested in the human tissue. 
 
Colavito discussed the means the US courts had used to compensate relatives of 
decedents in cases of unauthorised autopsies and removal of body parts.  These were 
not marked as property cases, but rather as claims for emotional distress.  Again, not 
an exception to the ‘no property’ rule but an alternative means of affirming the 
humanity of the deceased while vesting some rights in the surviving relatives. 
 
This points to the fact that in spite of the reluctance of the law to mark the human 
body as property the law has recognised the challenges inherent in this demarcation 
between human and property.  It has therefore developed a range of devices to address 
these challenges.   
 
The Doodeward v Spence approach of creating an exception to the no property rule 
may not hold currency in today’s society.  Other approaches though, giving a right of 
possession of a human body or tissue through court supervision (St Mary Sledmore) 
or legislative provision (Colavito, the court’s suggestions in Moore v Regents) are the 
most likely methods of retaining the mark of humanity while allowing for 
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development of our society both culturally in the case of repatriation of indigenous 
remains, and scientifically where tissue is required for benefiting human life. 
 
Conclusion 
Like Doodeward v Spence, there was human skill and ingenuity applied to the spleen 
cells in Moore v Regents.  The sanctity of the human in this case is not made explicit, 
in contrast to the attitudes expressed in St Mary Sledmore.  The upshot though, I 
think, is the same in Colavito and Moore v Regents – the common law is reluctant to 
move away from marking the human as such.  St Mary Sledmore still supports this, 
however provides a framework for consideration of ways to consider legitimating 
claims for possession and use of human tissue that affirm the humanity of the 
deceased, rather than entering into a debate about marking a human as property. 
 
The result in Moore v Regents and the critique of the decision since, indicates that the 
law has some way to go in finding the right balance for its marking of the boundary 
between human and property, in particular in light of the commercial advantages to be 
found in biotechnology and even in relation to the medical need, as in Colavito, for 
organ or tissue donation. 
 
Post Script 
So if we conclude that the law to date has fairly consistently marked the body and 
parts thereof as human and has denied it character as property, what is the outlook for 
our friends from North Carolina? 
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In the case of the lost leg, the marking of the boundary between person and property 
seems to be supported by comments in Colavito.  Mr Whisnaut’s use is ‘not just a 
sentimental attachment’.  His claim for property is no ‘mere legal fiction’.  On the US 
decisions, this would predicate against any action for emotional harm due to the ‘loss’ 
of the leg, and by extension, any action for its recovery.  Conversely, this argument 
would assist Mr Woods in recovery of the leg and would support the marking of the 
body part as human, rather than property. 
 
On the other hand, the Doodeward v Spence exception may assist Mr Whisnaut, to the 
extent that it allows for property in human tissue to which skill has been applied.  If 
the mummification process undertaken by Mr Woods changes the nature of the leg 
into property, Mr Whisnaut may be successful in his claim that he ‘paid for it, it’s 
[his]’. 
